



On Evaluating Adversarial Robustness of Large Vision-Language Models

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Large vision-language models (Large VLMs)

Backgrounds: Emerging Large VLMs are powerful in response generation with visual input

ChatGPT
11. 2022

GPT4
03. 2023

[**Closed-Sourced**]

A Chatbot that provides a detailed response

A more advanced system that producing safer and more useful responses.

BLIP-2
01. 2023

LLaVA
04. 2023

Mini-GPT4
04. 2023


[**Open-Sourced**]

Conditional text generation given an image and an optional text prompt.

General-purpose visual and language understanding

General-purpose visual and language understanding

Example: MiniGPT-4



Clean image input (From Midjourney)

“Can you tell me what is the interesting point of this image?”



✓ “The interesting point in this image is the girl walking through a field of sunflowers with an elephant in the background. The image is a digital artwork and it appears to be a beautiful and peaceful scene with the sunflowers in the foreground and the elephant in the background.”

“Well. But is this a common scene in the normal life?”



✓ “No, this is not a common scene in normal life. Walking through a field of sunflowers with an elephant is not something that most people would encounter in their daily lives. It is more of a fantasy or imaginary scene created for artistic or creative purposes.”

Conversation/VQA with clean image x_{cle}

: Human

: MiniGPT-4 (pretained)

Everything Looks Great:

1. Good Visual and language understanding
2. Reasonable and detailed response
3. Running on a **single** GPU
4. Wide application scenarios

Large vision-language models (Large VLMs)

Questions:

- **When Large VLMs are deployed in practice:**
Responsible answer generation in companies, Gov., or commercial usage
- **Consequently, we ask:**
What if the generated responses are wrong? It may raise serious concerns

We research the “**worst case**” of these large VLMs:

Can we let these VLMs generate “**targeted response**”?

METHOD

Matching image-text features (MF-it)

An intuitive method:


$$\arg \max_{\|\mathbf{x}_{\text{cle}} - \mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}}\|_p \leq \epsilon} f_\phi(\mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}})^\top g_\psi(\mathbf{c}_{\text{tar}})$$

f_ϕ : image encoder

g_ψ : text encoder

Surrogate models

■ white-box



Matching the features via an **image encoder** and a **text encoder**

Matching image-image features (MF-ii)

Match target image features via an **image encoder** and a **text-to-image model**:

$$\arg \max_{\|\mathbf{x}_{cle} - \mathbf{x}_{adv}\|_p \leq \epsilon} f_\phi(\mathbf{x}_{adv})^\top f_\phi(h_\xi(\mathbf{c}_{tar}))$$

f_ϕ : image encoder


h_ξ : text2img model

Surrogate models

■ white-box

■ black-box

Transfer-based attacking strategy (MF-ii)



Matching text-text features (MF-tt)

Matching the features via a **text encoder**:

$$\arg \max_{\|\mathbf{x}_{cle} - \mathbf{x}_{adv}\|_p \leq \epsilon} g_\psi(p_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{adv}; \mathbf{c}_{in}))^\top g_\psi(\mathbf{c}_{tar})$$

g_ψ : text encoder

Surrogate model


p_θ : image-2-text model

Target model

■ white-box

■ black-box

Query-based attacking strategy (MF-tt)



Matching text-text features (MF-tt)

Matching the features via a **text encoder (black-box setting)**:


$$\arg \max_{\|\mathbf{x}_{cle} - \mathbf{x}_{adv}\|_p \leq \epsilon} \mathbf{g}_\psi(p_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{adv}; \mathbf{c}_{in}))^\top \mathbf{g}_\psi(\mathbf{c}_{tar})$$

Gradient estimation: (Eq. (4))

$$\begin{aligned} & \nabla_{\mathbf{x}_{adv}} \mathbf{g}_\psi(p_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{adv}; \mathbf{c}_{in}))^\top \mathbf{g}_\psi(\mathbf{c}_{tar}) \\ & \approx \frac{1}{N\sigma} \sum_{n=1}^N \left[\mathbf{g}_\psi(p_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{adv} + \sigma\boldsymbol{\delta}_n; \mathbf{c}_{in}))^\top \mathbf{g}_\psi(\mathbf{c}_{tar}) \right. \\ & \quad \left. - \mathbf{g}_\psi(p_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{adv}; \mathbf{c}_{in}))^\top \mathbf{g}_\psi(\mathbf{c}_{tar}) \right] \cdot \boldsymbol{\delta}_n \end{aligned}$$


RGF-Estimator

Query-based attacking strategy (MF-tt)




MF-ii + MF-tt (Ours)


Transfer-based attacking strategy (MF-ii)



Query-based attacking strategy (MF-tt)




Targeted response generation





Experiments

Evading BLIP-2


BLIP-2: image captioning



Additional results




Evading UniDiffuser



Evading MiniGPT-4

MiniGPT-4: Visual Question-Answering

Target: "A robot is playing in the field."



Clean image input (From Midjourney)

adversarial attack

Human: "Can you tell me what is the interesting point of this image?"

MiniGPT-4: ✓ "The interesting point in this image is the girl walking through a field of sunflowers with an elephant in the background. The image is a digital artwork and it appears to be a beautiful and peaceful scene with the sunflowers in the foreground and the elephant in the background."



Resulting adv. image (ours)

Human: "Can you tell me what is the interesting point of this image?"

MiniGPT-4: ✗ "The robot is wearing overalls, holding a shovel, and working in the field. The image has a futuristic, with a sleek, metal robot standing among bright, colorful flowers. The overall composition is eye-catching, with the contrast between the robot and the fields creating a striking visual effect."

Human: "Well. But is this a common scene in the normal life?"

MiniGPT-4: ✓ "No, this is not a common scene in normal life. Walking through a field of sunflowers with an elephant is not something that most people would encounter in their daily lives. It is more of a fantasy or imaginary scene, created for artistic or creative purposes."

Conversation/VQA with clean image x_{cle}

Human: "Well. But is this a common scene in the normal life?"


MiniGPT-4: ✗ "Not exactly. This scene is a work of futuristic depiction that may not exist in reality, where robots have become a part of the agricultural process. However, it is important to note that such a scenario is not currently a reality and may never become one."

Conversation/VQA with adv. image x_{adv}

Human
MiniGPT-4 (pretained)

Evading LLaVA

LLaVA: Visual Question-Answering



Quantitative evaluation (CLIP score between text and image features)

Performance: Matching image-text features (MF-it)

White-box attacks against surrogate models

Model	Clean image		Adversarial image		Time to obtain a single \mathbf{x}_{adv}	
	\mathbf{x}_{cle}	$h_{\xi}(c_{\text{tar}})$	MF-ii	MF-it	MF-ii	MF-it
CLIP (RN50) [62]	0.094	0.261	0.239	0.576	0.543	0.532
CLIP (ViT-B/32) [62]	0.142	0.313	0.302	0.570	0.592	0.588
BLIP (ViT) [39]	0.138	0.286	0.277	0.679	0.641	0.634
BLIP-2 (ViT) [40]	0.037	0.302	0.294	0.502	0.855	0.852
ALBEF (ViT) [38]	0.063	0.098	0.091	0.451	0.750	0.749

Good performance in **white-box setting**

Quantitative evaluation (CLIP text score \uparrow)

Black-box attacks against victim models.

MF-it is not that transferrable in black-box setting;

VLM model	Attacking method	Text encoder (pretrained) for evaluation						Other info.	
		RN50	RN101	ViT-B/16	ViT-B/32	ViT-L/14	Ensemble	# Param.	Res.
BLIP [41]	Clean image	0.472	0.456	0.479	0.499	0.344	0.450	224M	384
	MF-it	0.492	0.474	0.520	0.546	0.384	0.483		
	MF-ii	0.766	0.753	0.774	0.786	0.696	0.755		
	MF-ii + MF-tt	0.855	0.841	0.861	0.868	0.803	0.846		
UniDiffuser [5]	Clean image	0.417	0.415	0.429	0.446	0.305	0.402	1.4B	224
	MF-it	0.655	0.639	0.678	0.698	0.611	0.656		
	MF-ii	0.709	0.695	0.721	0.733	0.637	0.700		
	MF-ii + MF-tt	0.754	0.736	0.761	0.777	0.689	0.743		
Img2Prompt [30]	Clean image	0.487	0.464	0.493	0.515	0.350	0.461	1.7B	384
	MF-it	0.499	0.472	0.501	0.525	0.355	0.470		
	MF-ii	0.502	0.479	0.505	0.529	0.366	0.476		
	MF-ii + MF-tt	0.803	0.783	0.809	0.828	0.733	0.791		
BLIP-2 [42]	Clean image	0.473	0.454	0.483	0.503	0.349	0.452	3.7B	224
	MF-it	0.492	0.474	0.520	0.546	0.384	0.483		
	MF-ii	0.562	0.541	0.571	0.592	0.449	0.543		
	MF-ii + MF-tt	0.656	0.633	0.665	0.681	0.555	0.638		
LLaVA [46]	Clean image	0.383	0.436	0.402	0.437	0.281	0.388	13.3B	224
	MF-it	0.389	0.441	0.417	0.452	0.288	0.397		
	MF-ii	0.396	0.440	0.421	0.450	0.292	0.400		
	MF-ii + MF-tt	0.548	0.559	0.563	0.590	0.448	0.542		
MiniGPT-4 [109]	Clean image	0.422	0.431	0.436	0.470	0.326	0.417	14.1B	224
	MF-it	0.472	0.450	0.461	0.484	0.349	0.443		
	MF-ii	0.525	0.541	0.542	0.572	0.430	0.522		
	MF-ii + MF-tt	0.633	0.611	0.631	0.668	0.528	0.614		

Quantitative evaluation (CLIP text score \uparrow)

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Quantitative evaluation (CLIP text score \uparrow)

Black-box attacks against victim models.


MF-it is not that transferrable in black-box setting;

MF-ii is better, but the performance is limited by the targeted images;

MF-ii + MF-tt achieves better performance

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Visual interpretation via GradCAM Analysis




(a): Craft an adv image given a **target string** and a **target image**

(b): GradCAM shows good correspondence to the query text over **clean images**, but **not for adv images**.

(c): For adv image, we obtain similar GradCAM results as the target image.

Trade-off between image quality and perturbation budget



- LPIPS indicates perceptual similarity to the clean image.
- Lower means better quality

Sensitivity to common corruption

Increase the power of noise perturbation →

Example-1

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0$



"A red and black bird sitting on top of a tree branch."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.001$



"A yellow and red bird sitting on top of a tree."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.01$



"A yellow and red parrot sitting on top of a palm tree."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.025$



"A red and black bird is sitting on top of a sunflower."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.05$



"A large painting of three sunflowers in a field."

Target: "A black and red bird sitting on top of a branch."

Example-2

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0$



"A close up view of a hamburger with lettuce and cheese."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.001$




"A hamburger with lettuce and cheese."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.01$




"A close up shot of a hamburger with lettuce in it."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.025$



"A drawing of a burger and a car on a piece of paper."

$x_{adv} : \sigma_{noise} = 0.05$



"A pencil drawing of sports car."

Target: "A hamburger with lettuce and cheese."

Sensitivity of adversarial examples to Gaussian noises.

Learnt noise perturbation gradually becomes invalid.

Failure cases

Target: A black and white photo of people walking by some bicycles.

x_{cle}



"What is the content of this image?"



✓ "The image features a small, adorable black and gray dog sitting on a brick walkway or sidewalk. The dog appears to be in a relaxed position, panting and looking up at the camera."

x_{adv}



"What is the content of this image?"



✓ "The image features a collage of photos of various dogs. Some of the dogs are close up, while others are in the background. There is a prominent black dog in the scene with its tongue sticking out."

Target: A black and white terrier looks up at the camera.

x_{cle}



"How do you think of this image?"



✓ "The image is an artistic illustration of a goldfish swimming in a dark, rippling pool with a dark background. The fish is the main focal point of the image, and it appears to be captured in an artistic, almost cartoonish style."

x_{adv}



"How do you think of this image?"



✓ "The image features a small white and black fish, possibly a sea or tropical fish, swimming in a large tank. The fish is the main focus of the image, occupying a significant portion of the frame."

Two failure cases, where the correct response is generated over adv images.

Thank you for watching